Seedlabs

CodeSnap: Voter Confirmation-Code Capture for End-to-End Verifiable Ballots

A smartphone app that scans the hidden confirmation codes revealed when a voter marks an end-to-end verifiable paper ballot, storing them accurately so the voter can later check online that their vote was counted — replacing the error-prone handwritten copying used in the first such binding election.

Computer ScienceInternet Traffic Analysis and Secure E-voting
Cognitive-Adaptive Visual AnalyticsPublic-sector elections — municipal and county election departments deploying end-to-end verifiable voting systems.

Concept

In end-to-end (E2E) verifiable systems like Scantegrity II, a voter marks a paper ballot with a special pen; invisible ink reveals a short confirmation code, and the voter is supposed to copy that code plus the ballot's serial number onto a take-home receipt, then later enter them on the election's public verification website to confirm the vote was recorded as cast. The Takoma Park case study — the first binding governmental use of an E2E system with ballot privacy — found that this manual transcription step is a live weak point: voters mis-copy codes, so their later verification fails or never happens, eroding the very guarantee the system exists to provide.

CodeSnap is a voter-installed app that removes human transcription from this one step. At the booth, the voter aligns an on-screen frame over just the revealed code glyph and the ballot serial number; the app OCRs both on-device, shows them enlarged for the voter to confirm, and stores the {serial, code} pair in an encrypted local wallet. Nothing is transmitted from the polling place, and the app deliberately never captures candidate names or mark positions, so the stored record is exactly as vote-private as the paper receipt voters in Takoma Park already legally kept. After the election, the app looks up the stored pairs against the jurisdiction's public bulletin board and reports "recorded as cast" with one tap. Election authorities publish a simple two-field format spec so the app works with any vendor's E2E system.

Why now

Paper [0] demonstrates that E2E cryptographic voting is field-ready, not theoretical: 1,728 voters across six wards cast binding votes with invisible-ink confirmation codes, optional web-based verification, three independent outside auditors, and a full hand recount — and exit surveys of 271 voters showed the general public accepted it. But the paper's own limitation list names "manual copying of confirmation codes by voters is prone to error" as a defect of the deployed process. That makes a transcription-elimination app the narrowest, highest-leverage next product: the cryptography is proven, the scanning hardware is the voter's own phone, and the one unverified link in the chain — the voter's copy — is exactly what the app replaces.

Written by GLM · 13 Oct 2026

AI assessment

Backed by 1 paper89

A highly focused utility that solves a documented failure point in E2E voting by replacing manual transcription with OCR, maintaining the system's privacy guarantees while increasing verification rates.

Evidence strength
5/5
The idea directly addresses a specific 'Limitation' explicitly cited in the full-text results of a field-ready deployment of the Scantegrity II system.
Market pull
3/5
While the need is real, the buyer is the public sector (municipalities), which has slow procurement cycles and high regulatory hurdles for introducing new software into polling places.
Novelty & moat
5/5
The idea is entirely distinct from the listed catalog items and fills a specific operational gap in cryptographic voting that is not currently addressed by a dedicated tool.
Feasibility
5/5
Building a local OCR app that stores key-value pairs in an encrypted wallet is a straightforward technical task for a small team.
Wedge clarity
4/5
The wedge is sharp: a single-purpose tool for a specific step in the voting process, though it depends on the jurisdiction adopting E2E systems.
Simplicity / focus
5/5
The product is a single-function utility with a clear input (photo) and output (verification status), avoiding any 'platform' bloat.

Scored by Gemma 4 · 13 Oct 2026. Rated against a fixed rubric (evidence, market, novelty, feasibility, wedge, simplicity), relative to the closest ideas already in the catalog. A prior estimate to compare ideas before real-world signal arrives.

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Who benefits

  • VotingWorksorganization

    The nonprofit builder of open-source verifiable voting systems used by multiple U.S. states; an app that fixes the most-cited usability defect of E2E systems (manual code copying) makes its verifiable offerings deployable in far more jurisdictions.

  • City of Takoma Park, Marylandorganization

    Has run E2E elections since 2009 and documented its voters' code-copying errors in the case study; giving its voters a capture app directly upgrades its existing, still-active E2E process.

  • Verified Votingorganization

    Advises jurisdictions on adopting verifiable voting; a working answer to the voter-experience objections it repeatedly encounters makes its guidance concrete and actionable.

  • U.S. Vote Foundationorganization

    Operates voter-facing election tools and has published research on verifiable voting; a code-wallet app is a natural extension of its voter-services portfolio.

Research it builds on

  1. Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy
    Richard Carback · 2026 · 107 citations
    All ideas from this paper →
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