Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy
Richard Carback · 2026 · 107 citationsRead the paper
On November 3, 2009, voters in Takoma Park, Maryland, cast ballots for the mayor and city council members using the Scantegrity II voting system-the first time any end-to-end (E2E) voting system with ballot privacy has been used in a binding governmental election.This case study describes the various efforts that went into the election-including the improved design and implementation of the voting system, streamlined procedures, agreements with the city, and assessments of the experiences of voters and poll workers.The election, with 1728 voters from six wards, involved paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes, instant-runoff voting with write-ins, early and absentee (mail-in) voting, dual-language ballots, provisional ballots, privacy sleeves, any-which-way scanning with parallel conventional desktop scanners, end-to-end verifiability based on optional web-based voter verification of votes cast, a full hand recount, thresholded authorities, three independent outside auditors, fully-disclosed software, and exit surveys for voters and pollworkers.Despite some glitches, the use of Scantegrity II was a success, demonstrating that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public.
What the full text shows
Tested in real conditions- Successfully conducted the first end-to-end (E2E) binding governmental election with ballot privacy. — 1728 voters (Municipal election in Takoma Park, Maryland, November 3, 2009)
- Demonstrated that E2E cryptographic voting systems can be effectively used and accepted by the general public. (Based on exit surveys of 271 voters and pollworker assessments)
- Setup
- 1728 voters across six wards; used parallel conventional desktop scanners, privacy sleeves, and three independent outside auditors.
- How
- Implemented the Scantegrity II system using paper ballots with invisible-ink confirmation codes revealed by decoder pens, combined with a public web-based bulletin board for voter verification and tally auditing.
- Limitations
- Unreliable ballot printers · Manual copying of confirmation codes by voters is prone to error · Potential for identification attacks via IP address recording on the verification website · Need for better accessibility and improved image analysis for unreadable ballots
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